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Abstract
Stakeholders frequently regard CSR initiatives as inauthentic gestures even when the
corporation is trying to behave responsibly. In this study we develop theory about which
initiatives are likely to be viewed as authentic or not by which observers, when and why. We
draw on concepts of authenticity from marketing and prior work on CSR, and on theories of
institutional pluralism as the basis for our propositions. We propose that different institutional
logics value different criteria for assessing authenticity, and develop a model to explain how
level of agreement on these criteria comes about and leads to varying outcomes in terms of
perceived authenticity.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; institutional complexity; authenticity; stakeholders
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Introduction
The nominal goal of most corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives is to help
corporations achieve sustained competitive advantage by attracting and retaining support for
the corporation from consumers and other stakeholders (Devinney, 2009; Jones 1999;
Marquis, Glynn and Davis 2007; Porter & Kramer 2006; 2011, Waddock, 2008). CSR
initiatives often involve activities and goals, such as philanthropy, community development,
environmental conservation or social justice, that appear to be at odds with the corporate goal
of maximizing financial returns (van Marrewijk, 2003). These actions may even appear to
prioritize the well-being of society over competitive strategy or the creation of value for
shareholders (Devinney, 2009; Friedman 1962). Despite these concerns, more corporations
are engaging in CSR activities and launching initiatives to benefit society, the environment
and diverse sets of stakeholders (UN Global Compact, 2013). This trend suggests that CSR
has become a taken for granted element of corporate behavior.
The reality is that while the legitimacy of this trend is seldom questioned by corporate
executives (Liedtka, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011), CSR initiatives are frequently
challenged by other stakeholders who view these programs as window dressing or
greenwashing (Beckman et al., 2009; Clarkson, 1995; Classen & Roloff, 2012; Delmas &
Burbano, 2011; Ewing, Allen & Ewing, 2012; Jones 1999; Perez-Batres et al., 2012; Parguel,
Benoît-Moreau & Larceneux, 2011). Corporate social responsibility initiatives may
sometimes reinforce or create negative perceptions of the corporation even when the
corporation is apparently doing right. To overcome this problem, scholars and managers need
to understand which initiatives are likely to be resisted by which stakeholders, when and why.
How negative the reception of a CSR initiative is often depends on whether
stakeholders view the initiative as authentic or not (Grayson & Martinec, 2004; Liedtka,
2008). An object, action or claim is perceived as authentic and therefore as real, genuine or
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true, when it is judged as worthy of acceptance or belief as conforming to or based on fact
(Merriam Webster On-line, 2013). An authentic object is what it is said to be. Authenticity
has become a widely used concept in the marketing and business ethics literatures, where it is
used to evaluate the reception of brands (Grayson & Martinec, 2004; McShane &
Cunningham, 2012;) and CSR initiatives (Bingham et al., 2011; Classen & Roloff, 2012;
Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Ewing, Allen & Ewing, 2012; Perez-Batres et al., 2012).
A major difficulty with the current approach to authenticity is the absence of a
discussion of the social construction of beliefs and facts. Most authenticity work seems to
make the simplifying assumptions that either facts are independent of belief systems or that
only one belief system operates. These assumptions seem out of place in CSR research, given
that scholars have recognized significant conflict within corporations between the profit
maximization expectations logic of shareholders (Friedman 1962), the corporate manager’s
hierarchical approach (Devinney, 2009; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011), and the ethical and
community interests often found among employees (Liedtka, 2008; McShane &
Cunningham, 2012). If authenticity is to be a truly useful concept we need a theoretical lens
that is descriptive of multiple worldviews and the conflicts and agreements between them.
The ‘logics’ approach to institutional theory provides such a lens. Thornton, Jones and
Kury (2005) define institutional logics as “… organizing principles [that] spell out the
vocabularies of motive, the logics of action, and the senses of self for … participants
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). They reveal the deeply held and often unexamined assumptions
by which reasoning takes place (p. 128).” Within this stream of theory, pluralism (Thornton,
Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012) is the idea that multiple institutional logics co-exist and that
actors use them to make sense of the world as they move from context to context (Besharov
and Smith 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos 2013;
Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005). Pluralism is a useful lens because it embraces the idea that

4

institutions and the belief systems that surround them are much more complex and malleable
than earlier views portrayed them. Pluralism has implications for authenticity because it
means that when observers use different institutional logics, corporate actors may make
claims for their CSR initiatives that are wholly or partially incompatible with the values,
beliefs and norms of observers. If managers fail to understand stakeholder logics they run the
risk of having their CSR initiatives rejected. The final piece required to resolve the problem
of authenticity is theory that explains how judgments are made regarding the conformity of
CSR initiatives with the expectations and norms imbedded in a logic. This is a gap that the
marketing literature has begun to fill by distinguishing between qualitatively different types
of authenticity.
Our research question is: How does institutional pluralism influence which CSR
initiatives are likely to be viewed as more or less authentic by which stakeholders and when?
We try to answer this question by discussing the relevant literatures, drawing connections
between them and synthesizing a general integrative model. As such this is a work of
descriptive conceptual theory building rather than an attempt at empirical validation.
Literature Review
The history of corporate behavior over the last century provides some justification for
the belief that corporations, more than other actors, need to work at being socially
responsible. Large, publicly traded multinational corporations control an undue proportion of
resources worldwide (Hawken 1993; Matten & Moon 2008; UN Global Compact, 2013).
When managed to achieve shareholder and executive wealth maximization, corporations have
frequently been seen as having negative effects on society. Corporate social responsibility is
the idea that “…corporations receive a social sanction from society that requires that they, in
return, contribute to the growth and development of that society (Devinney, 2009, p. 44).”
What form that contribution should take is the basis for Friedman’s (1962) critique of
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corporate philanthropy. Friedman argues that management has a strict fiduciary duty based to
create shareholder wealth. He asserts that if shareholders want to be philanthropic, they can
use returns from investments in corporations in ways that benefit society. The flaw in
Friedman’s critique is that it does not address the indirect, reputational or time-lagged costs
to the corporation and society that arise when management decisions focus on profit.
Increased awareness of corporations’ impact on society and the environment has
changed societal beliefs about the obligations of corporations in two ways. First, cash is now
seen as just one of many resources that corporations can leverage to benefit society through
corporate social action (Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007). Corporate voluntarism (Pajo & Lee,
2011; Yim & Fock, 2013) is an example of corporate responses to this belief, as employers
involve their employees in CSR initiatives that are intended to benefit communities and
simultaneously increase employee satisfaction and retention. Second, societies are concerned
about the actions that corporations take in the course of normal business activities, not just
ancillary activities that address social or environmental concerns (UN Global Compact,
2013). The ubiquity of social and sustainability reporting among large corporations indicates
that institutional norms and expectations play an important role in shaping both the CSR
initiatives and the operational practices of corporations because they strongly influence how
these actions are perceived and evaluated. Porter and Kramer (2006, 2011) focus on this
belief as they argue for the alignment of CSR initiatives with corporate strategy.
It is useful to specify what we mean by stakeholders. We define stakeholders to a
corporation as the organizations, individuals and constituencies that have the capability to
influence or be influenced by corporate action (Freeman 1984; Marquis, Glynn & Davis,
2007). In this study we are not concerned so much with what makes different stakeholders
salient (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) as we are with developing theory to explain
differential stakeholder responses to corporate actions that reflect different ways of
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evaluating CSR initiatives (Jensen, 2002). This raises the question of whether priorities
within stakeholder groups should be conceived of as homogenous (Wolfe & Putler, 2002).
We draw on theories of institutional pluralism and authenticity to develop a model of how
stakeholder observers evaluate CSR initiatives and conclude that while priorities within
stakeholder groups may often be relatively homogenous, circumstances where they are not
can be explained by examining the structure of pluralism within fields.
Institutional pluralism
Scholars have proposed seven archetypal sectoral logics common to many societies:
markets, corporations, professions, states, families, religions and communities (Thornton,
Jones and Kury 2005; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012), as shown in Table 1. The
logics associated with each sector depend on their own institutions, define identity their own
ways and have their own values, norms, goals and means. For example corporate, state,
family and religion based logics all value position within hierarchies as a key to identity.
Profit is a valued outcome in several logics but these logics may offer competing
prescriptions about the priority between individual and communal interests in profit seeking.
When logics are compatible, actors and observers may agree superficially and take it for
granted that agreement is at depth (Weick, 1979). Although these sectoral logics can be
identified in many settings, it is worthwhile to remind the reader that different instantiations
of these logics will vary in specific contexts. The sectoral framework is useful in the present
study because it provides a simple way to illustrate differences between logics and the
socially constructed schemata that observers use to make judgments.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue, following Goodrick and Salancik (1996), that how
rigid the prescriptions of a logic are depends on the specificity with which goals and means
are prescribed by it. Less specific prescriptions allow for greater discretion concerning which
goals and means are accepted as legitimate. Goals/means specificity determines discretion
7

within an institutional logic, where discretion is defined as the level of freedom an actor has
to choose which prescriptions concerning goals and means will be complied with. The level
of discretion within an institutional logic is greater when it is fails to define norms, goals and
means for some contexts or accepts multiple norms, goals and means as legitimate. This
suggests that how locked into multiple logics an actor is depends on the level of discretion in
each logic. If norms, goals and means are not tightly specified by the relevant logics, the
actor has discretion to choose which logic applies (Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis, 2011).
Although Wolfe and Putler (2002) raise the question of the homogeneity of priorities
within stakeholder groups, it is also important to ask about the homogeneity of priorities
within observers. There is some evidence that individuals shift from logic to logic as they
move between contexts (Pache and Santos 2013). Weick (1979) calls context based
sensemaking ‘partial inclusion’ and argues that it is important because groups and
organizations are structured by shared, interlocking behaviors rather than by the attachment
of individuals to each other. Individuals belong to many groups and contexts, and apply
different logics as they move between them (March 1994). Where an actor is situated may
change the guiding logic the actor uses to make sense of the world and the stakeholder groups
he or she identifies with. Weick implies that this is more or less a one to one relation – that a
single logic guides action and identity at any time. This allows the actor to avoid cognitive
dissonance and inconsistent behavior in the present and within each context over time.
In contrast, studies of institutional entrepreneurship have shown that individuals and
organizations borrow, reconfigure and transpose norms, goals and means between logics as
they work to change institutions (Battilana and Boxenbaum, 2005; Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis,
2011). Besharov and Smith (2013) propose that multiple logics can be simultaneously central
to fields, organizations and individuals. While polycentrism seems reasonable, especially if
an observer is governed by equally powerful but compatible logics, internal conflict is likely
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to result if the logics in question are incompatible. How a conflicted observer would make a
judgment about a CSR initiative would depend on the relative importance of the logics, the
consequences to the observer of the initiative and the level of discretion the observer had in
choosing between the logics in question.
Authenticity, legitimacy and CSR
There are competing definitions of authenticity. As a number of reviews of this
literature have concluded, authenticity is generally conceptualized in one of two ways
(Bingham et al., 2011; Classen & Roloff, 2012; Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson & Jonssen,
2013; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Ewing, Allen & Ewing, 2012; Grayson & Martinec, 2004;
Kovács, Carroll & Lehman, 2013; Liedtka, 2008; Perez-Batres et al., 2012; Yim & Fock,
2013). One take on authentic behavior can be characterized as perceptions that an actor is
being true to itself (Liedtka, 2008), while the second take is characterized as comparison to a
socially constructed standard (McShane and Cunningham, 2102). The first approach
emphasizes perceptions of fit between actions and the unique identity of the actor or object,
while the second emphasizes conformity to rules associated with a role, category, or some
other socially constructed schema.
In terms of CSR, an observer concerned with the genuineness of an action would ask
whether a particular initiative is consistent with the corporation’s perceived identity as
expressed in its current and past behavior, viewed through the lens of the observer’s logic. An
observer concerned with comparison to a socially constructed standard might ask whether the
initiative met what the observer felt was an appropriate standard for a corporate actor in the
situation. These judgments could clearly lead to composite perceptions of authenticity – an
initiative could be true to identity but fail to fit with socially constructed standards, or fit with
socially constructed standards while being inconsistent with the identity indicated by a
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corporation’s past or current actions. Since there is no reason to suppose that observers make
only one kind of judgment, it is clear that authenticity can be a complex composite.
This resonates with the idea, based in the semiotics of Pierce (1955), that perceived
authenticity is not an all or nothing judgment (Grayson & Martinec, 2004; Kovács, Carroll &
Lehman, 2013). Pierce (1955) draws a distinction between two kinds of signs, indices and
icons. An index is a sign that puts the interpreter in dynamical contact with the object
signified, and thus connects to the object’s unique identity. Grayson and Martinec (2004)
define indexical authenticity as the judgment that an object has a factual or spatiotemporal
link to something else that signifies that the object is original or genuine. A plumb-bob is an
index because it links the observer to the unique identity of the vertical dimension. An artist’s
signature and date on a painting create indexical authenticity by confirming the unique
identity of the painting. Provenance established through an unbroken chain of custody or
documentation creates formal indexical authenticity used to uniquely identify objects used as
evidence in judicial processes.
Organizations have frequently been argued to have unique identities (Albert and
Whetten, 1985; Hsu and Elsbach, 2014; Liedtka, 2008; McShane and Cunningham, 2102;
Smith, 2011). While some critics have proposed that this is a fallacy (Martin, Feldman, Hatch
& Sitkin, 1983), a wide variety of research has shown that stakeholders, particularly internal
stakeholders, perceive organizations as enacting idiosyncratic patterns of behavior that are
attributed to unique organizational identities. In institutional theory the extent to which a
perceived identity deviates from the norms associated with an assigned role makes identity
unique and determines the extent to which the organization is regarded as a legitimate actor
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; Smith, 2011). As shown in Table 1, each logic has
its own basis for assigning identity including a system of legitimate roles actors can occupy
(March 1994). We conceptualize perceived identity as the extent to which the past and
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present behavior of the corporation deviates from the standards associated with the role the
observer expects the corporation to fulfill. What the baseline role is depends on the logic the
observer uses to understand the world. The issue is not whether identities are truly unique,
but that observers see them as such and develop expectations about the kinds of behavior that
are consistent with this identity in a given situation (March, 1994).
When scholars have examined perceptions of corporate objects such as a strategy
(Liedtka, 2008), brand extension (Spiggle, Nguyen & Caravella, 2012) or organizational
identity (Beckman, Colwell & Cunningham, 2009; Ewing, Allen & Ewing, 2012; Hsu and
Elsbach, 2014; McShane & Cunningham, 2012; Smith, 2011) they have relied on the
observer’s experience to assess conformity of the action with the unique identity of the actor
as expressed in its past and current practice. Scholars have observed that perceived
consistency between social responsibility initiatives and employee perceptions of corporate
identity tends to increase employee participation in those initiatives (Cording et al., 2013;
Liedtka, 2008; Yim & Fock, 2013) in part because it leads employees to perceive the
corporate action as indexically authentic (McShane & Cunningham, 2012). The issue for
indexical authenticity is not what any corporation should do, but what this corporation does,
and whether that is consistent with its past and current behavior, given the current situation.
Because past and current behaviors are driven by partly by compliance with socially
constructed norms, identity fits neatly into the idea of institutional logics and appropriateness
(March 1994; Thornton et al., 2012). While we normally think of corporations as adhering to
the corporate logic of managerial capitalism, some corporations adopt different logics.
Although Patagonia, the outdoor clothing company, and Zingerman’s, the Ann Arbor food
and consulting company, have established community driven identities that mark them as
almost anti-corporate (Conlin, 2014; Kasperkevic, 2014). Family owned firms are often seen
as fundamentally different from widely held firms (Bingham et al. 2011).
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The second kind of sign is an icon. Pierce (1955) defines icons as signs that link
objects to interpreters through similarity. Iconic authenticity involves what Ewing, Allen and
Ewing (2012) call schematic fit – the object mostly corresponds to the elements of a socially
constructed, shared schema. Iconic authenticity is what we recognize when we say that an
object ‘in the style of’ is an authentic reproduction of an original. Something that is iconically
authentic is a substitute in some way – it has appropriate features, stands in an appropriate
relation to some reference or looks like it belongs. Kovács, Carroll and Lehman (2013) study
iconic authenticity when they ask survey respondents how well a restaurant conforms to
schemata for judging the quality of restaurants. They ask about such things as whether it
matters if the menu is unique, or if the business is family owned, or whether it is part of a
franchise or chain and so on. These questions allow the researchers to position examples of
restaurants on an iconic authenticity, but it is also worth noting that the perceived unique
identity of a restaurant could be determined by the same factors, suggesting that identify and
schemata are related (March, 1994; Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al. 2012)
Students of institutional theory will recognize that perceptions of iconic authenticity
are related to the concept of legitimacy, and that perceptions of legitimacy depend on the
position of the observer. Actions that conform to the prescriptions of an institutional logic
grant actors (individuals or organizations) legitimacy in the form of acceptance by actors who
are also guided by the logic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Matten & Moon, 2008; Suchman,
1995). While some disagreement exists about the meaning of legitimacy (Deephouse &
Suchman, 2008), we adopt Suchman’s definition: ‘Legitimacy is a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (1995: 574).
Legitimacy signals agreement that the actor is behaving in ways consistent with the
observer’s logic. Because legitimacy is achieved through comparison of perceived behavior
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to a socially constructed schema, legitimacy judgments are fundamental to perceptions of
iconic authenticity.
Perceptions of indexical authenticity and iconic authenticity arise from judgments
about different aspects of the same objects. Indexical authenticity is the result of an
observer’s judgment about whether a claim about an action links to the unique identity of the
actor. A claim that a particular CSR initiative represents disinterested social action can be
tested against a corporation’s unique identity as expressed in an observer’s perceptions of its
past and present behavior. Iconic authenticity is linked to legitimacy judgments that ask
whether an initiative is perceived as similar to an appropriate prototype, schema or standard.
These judgments contribute to complex perceptions of authenticity. An initiative that is
regarded as indexically inauthentic because it is not consistent with the observer’s
perceptions of the corporation’s unique identity may be perceived as iconically authentic by
the same observer because it is a legitimate action for a corporation to pursue.
It seems obvious that observers who operate within different institutional logics may
arrive at different perceptions of the authenticity of CSR initiatives. Adherents of competing
institutional logics may take it for granted that incompatible standards should be used to
judge authenticity. For example there are different formal standards for judging the
authenticity of corporate social missions based on different views of corporations. “Social
benefit” or “B” corporations assign themselves social missions in addition to serving
shareholder interests (Hiller, 2013), while the UN Global Compact framework (United
Nations 2013) calls on corporations to adopt ten principles that do not consider shareholder
interests at all. Which standard is applied depends on the observer’s position, which in turn
suggests that agreement about authenticity will be more likely if the goals and means of the
CSR initiative are appropriate to the observer’s guiding logic. Appropriateness should matter
for both indexical and iconic authenticity judgments.
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Theory Development
Our review of the literature allows us to develop a framework for the many possible
ways an observer could arrive at the judgment that a CSR initiative is authentic. Since this is
a problem of perception, the framework needs to specify which actor performs an initiative,
which observer is making the authenticity judgment, which institutional logics are involved
in the actor-initiative-observer triad, and whether the CSR initiative is appropriate to the
observer’s guiding logic. Stakeholder theory and institutional pluralism provide means for
distinguishing between types of actors and observers in terms of the institutional logic each
type is generally thought to adhere to. Institutional pluralism helps us understand archetypal
differences between logics and the degree of discretion in observer logics. These determine
the level of agreement between actor and observer on fit with identity and appropriateness
given the observer’s position and hence whether an initiative is perceived as indexically
authentic, iconically authentic or inauthentic. This perception in turn influences how strongly
the observer supports or resists the initiative.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Figure 1 assembles these constructs into the theoretical model that guides the
remainder of this study. This model is based on several assumptions. The first is that the actor
is a corporation that is engaged in a CSR initiative that it claims serves economic, social or
environmental ends important to its stakeholders. The observer is assumed to be a stakeholder
of the corporation and can be an individual or collective entity. The appropriateness of an
initiative within observer logics depends on the fit between initiative’s goals and means and
the observer’s logic. Observers can perceive an organization’s identity as unique or as
conforming to the socially constructed behavioral norms prescribed by the observer’s logic.
The level of discretion in the observer’s logic depends on the specificity with which goals are
prescribed by the observer’s guiding logic (Greenwood et al. 2011). As shown in the figure,
discretion does not have a direct effect on authenticity judgments, since discretion implies
14

that the observer is free to challenge or support the initiative. Greater discretion decreases the
likelihood that we can predict the observer’s reaction, because he/she is able to draw upon
competing logics. Whether discretion matters depends on whether the observer benefits or
suffers from the initiative. We assume that when the observer benefits, discretion will make it
more likely that the observer will accept the goals of the corporate logic in order to justify the
benefit it receives. In the absence of discretion, even an observer who benefits may be
constrained from acting in a self-serving way.
The appropriateness of an initiative’s goals and means within the observer’s logic is
an important driver of the observer’s judgment about the iconic authenticity of the CSR
initiative. Appropriateness is conceptually a continuum with a negative anchor in the state
where observer logics prescribe goals and means that are at odds with the initiative and a
positive anchor in the state where the initiative’s goals and means are viewed as appropriate.
The McDonalds Corporation has developed socially responsible menu initiatives
designed to promote healthy nutrition (salads, fruit) as part of the corporate goal of aligning
its strategic actions with the good of the community (Porter and Kramer 2011). These
initiatives receive a disproportionate share of promotion efforts but sell poorly and are
disparaged by many commentators (Patton, 2013). While it is true that the idea of eating fresh
food is spreading among consumers, this nutrition goal is not consistent with the market
based logic consumers are guided by when they buy fast food from McDonalds. Resistance
by franchisees suggests that the fresh food goal is also viewed as inappropriate by internal
stakeholders well. In contrast, this initiative is regarded as iconically authentic by food
science professionals who view it as an appropriate move toward better nutrition and
simultaneously object to it as being too limited and inconsistent with the McDonalds menu.
Perez-Batres and his co-authors (2012) discuss the difference between symbolic or
substantive CSR initiatives. It is important to realize that nominal/symbolic commitment to
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goals and means is not enough to establish appropriateness. Commitments must be
substantive to be credible. The CSR literature has widely recognized that actions that
resemble peer initiatives but require little commitment from the corporation are frequently
claimed as socially responsible by adherents of the corporate logic (van Marrewijk, 2003) but
rejected by observers. When observers are willing to accept initiatives that make substantive
commitments but are offered only symbolic action, the initiative is likely to be viewed as
iconically inauthentic. Claiming social responsibility without substantive commitment is
called greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Parguel, Benoît-Moreau & Larceneux, 2011)
and will be regarded as inauthentic if and when it is discovered.
When CSR initiatives are viewed as substantive and as having appropriate goals and
means the likely outcome is that the CSR initiative is accepted as iconically authentic. When
commitments are symbolic or goals and means are viewed as inappropriate, the likely
outcome is that the initiative will be assessed as iconically inauthentic.
Proposition 1: The appropriateness of the goals and means of CSR initiative within
observer logics will be positively related to iconic authenticity judgments.
Observer self-interest, which fits with a logic of consequence, is a necessary element
of our theory. While it does not play a major role in institutional pluralism or authenticity
theory, it is critical to stakeholder theory (Devinney, 2009). Even when observers adhere to a
logic that would ordinarily challenge a CSR initiative, benefiting from the initiative will
make them more likely to view it as iconically authentic in some degree. For example,
researchers whose work is funded as part of a CSR initiative would have a difficult time
arguing that the initiative is authentic even if the outcomes claimed for the initiative had no
basis in science. Likewise, observers who are harmed by an initiative would have a difficult
time assessing it as iconically authentic even when the goals and means of the initiative have
a high degree of schematic fit with the prescriptions of the observer’s logic.
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Proposition 2: Iconic authenticity judgments will be positively related to the extent to
which the observer benefits from that initiative.
Observer discretion partly depends on the specificity with which the observer’s logic
prescribes (or proscribes) goals. Some logics are relatively loose in terms of the means they
prescribe, but very rigid with respect to goals. The shareholder take on market capitalism
prescribes profit as its goal, but is highly ambiguous as to the means it allows for. Other
logics may be rigid with respect to means but accepting of a variety of goals. The logic of
professionalism among scientists dictates rigor in the means scientists use, but is accepting of
a variety of goals beyond discovery. These can include social benefits, profit, or personal
status. Religious logic may narrowly prescribe both means and goals (Friedland 2001) while
community logic may be ambiguous with respect to both (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury
2012). Discretion also depends on how tightly the observer adheres to a single guiding logic
in a given context. When several logics are central (Besharov and Smith, 2013) or when
logics have been hybridized (Battilana and Dorado, 2011) the observer can choose which
logic to apply. Discretion gives the observer freedom to choose which goals should be used to
assess an initiative.
When discretion is limited or absent, compatibility will be the primary driver of
agreement between corporation and observer on which criteria will be used to assess
authenticity. As discretion increases, the observer has choices. Discretion makes it possible
accept or reject the goals the actor’s logic proposes. To determine which occurs it is
necessary to relate observer discretion to the benefits (or harms) the observer expects from
the initiative in question. Discretion should make observers more likely to accept corporate
goals when the observer benefits, and to reject them when the observer is harmed.
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Proposition 3: Observer discretion will positively moderate the relationship between
the extent to which the observer benefits from an initiative and iconic authenticity
judgments.
The upper part of Figure 1 is concerned with judgments about indexical authenticity
of CSR initiatives. These are judgments concerning whether or not the initiative is ‘true’ to or
consistent with of the unique identity of the organization. This is distinct from the schematic
fit with the observer’s logic that characterizes iconic authenticity because it depends on
linking the initiative to what the observer regards as the unique identity of the corporation. In
our model this perception is more likely when the goals and means of the CSR initiatives are
viewed appropriate within the observer’s guiding logic. This relationship depends on and is
moderated by how unique the observer perceives corporate identity to be.
If the observer sees the corporation as ‘just another’ corporation, indexical
authenticity is similar to iconic authenticity. As perceived identity deviates from standards for
the role, the question of how appropriate the initiative is within the observer’s logic become
less important for judging indexical authenticity. We assume that stakeholders develop
perceptions of corporate identity based on their own guiding logic (Liedtka, 2008; March
1994; Marquis, Glynn and Davis, 2007; McShane and Cunningham, 2012). Stakeholders
who are guided by family or community logics should assign a different role to corporate
actors (Bingham et al. 2011) than stakeholders who are guided by a market or community
logic. In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court ruled that some corporations
share religious rights with individuals, suggesting that the justices view corporate identity
from within a state based citizenship logic. Seen from within a community or state logic, a
corporation could be identified more as a good or bad community member than as an
economic entity whose profit goals are paramount. The observer’s guiding logic thus plays an
important role in the construction of perceived identity (Thornton et al., 2012).
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One of the difficulties of an approach to authenticity based on perceptions of
corporate identity is that not all stakeholders have sufficient knowledge of a corporation’s
actions and claims, now and in the past, to perceive a unique identity. Employees and
managers (Liedtka, 2008; McShane and Cunningham, 2012) have direct experience with the
corporations that employ them, and suppliers or customers may have almost equally strong
relationships. McShane and Cunningham (2012) studied employee responses to CSR
initiatives. They propose that “employees’ authenticity judgments… are informed by the
extent to which the organization’s image, as presented by the CSR program, is a reflection of
its true identity (p 96).” Communities, interest groups and other more remote stakeholders
may come into contact with a CSR initiative with essentially no knowledge of the corporation
other than its legal status. In the absence of attention it is therefore possible and even likely
that some stakeholders will rely on their standard schemas for how a corporation should
behave to construct identity and thus judgments of indexical authenticity. The strength of this
relationship depends on the amount of attention that the observer gives to what the
corporation does and says. Scholars have often assumed that perceptions of identity derived
from active attention are more likely to be treated as genuine (Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson
& Jonssen, 2013; Liedtka, 2008; Ocasio, 1996).
Different kinds of stakeholders pay different levels of attention to what corporations
do. An employee or a customer has an intimate relationship with a corporation – he or she
knows how the corporation’s behavior deviates from the expected, and is thus in a privileged
position for developing a perception the corporation’s identity as unique. Stakeholders who
do not have these kinds of insider relationships can also develop a strong perception of
unique identity by attending to second hand reports of what corporations do, especially as
compared to what they say. It is equally true that some insiders pay little attention to what
corporations do and say, beyond their own immediate concerns. It is for this reason that we
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argue that the uniqueness of perceived identity depends on the level of attention an observer
pays to corporate behavior rather than on membership in a specific stakeholder group.
Perceiving a corporate identity as unique is unlikely to have a direct effect on whether an
observer regards an initiative as indexically authentic, but it is likely to moderate the
relationship between perceptions of whether an initiative is appropriate within the observer’s
logic and the judgment of indexical authenticity.
For example, the Monsanto Company and the Cargill Corporation are involved in a
CSR initiative with the Gates Foundation to combat the epidemic of brown streak virus that
has decimated cassava production across East Africa. The involvement of these firms in this
project, which has shown considerable promise of technical success, has drawn negative
reactions from some food science based observers and from many African adherents of the
economic development and community logics (McNeil, 2010). The fact that the project draws
on Monsanto’s expertise in genetic modification leads some observers to believe that the
project puts the genetic stock of yet another important crop at risk of being controlled by this
corporation, given Monsanto’s ongoing history of aggressive prosecution customers as it tries
to protect its intellectual property rights. Cargill’s position as the leading trader of cassava
starch suggests to other observers that Cargill might be involved in the initiative to
consolidate its dominant position. The observers in question view the initiative as
inconsistent with Monsanto’s and Cargill’s identities as expressed in the corporations’ current
and prior behavior. They therefore see the project as an indexically inauthentic move
motivated by self-interest even though the corporations try to offset this history by giving the
modified genetic stock away for free and placing the intellectual property in the public
domain. Their partner, the Gates Foundation, appears to views Monsanto’s and Cargill’s
involvement in the initiative as consistent with the corporate logic’s standards of socially
responsible behavior, and therefore defends the initiative as iconically authentic.
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Wicki and van der Kaaj (2007) report on similar problems with the perception of
sustainability initiatives for Chiquita Brands. Chiquita engaged in a decade long project to
improve the sustainability of its operations in tropical regions without making public claims
of social responsibility. These actions were justified within the corporation as strategic and
self-interested. When Chiquita began to make social responsibility claims in its branding,
adherents of community, state and professional logics challenged the claims as inconsistent
with the corporation’s historical actions and the identity they perceived, that Chiquita was an
aggressive exploiter of the environment in less developed tropical economies. Although
certification of the sustainability claims by the Rainforest Alliance led some actors to accept
the corporation’s criteria for evaluating its claims, most observers regarded the initiative as
inauthentic because it did not fit with their perception of the corporation’s identity.
Stakeholder perceptions of unique identities thus constrain the role of schematic
appropriateness in the construction of indexical authenticity. When identities are less unique
fit between the corporation’s CSR initiatives and the standards associated with the
corporation’s role in the observer’s logic drives indexical authenticity judgments.
Proposition 4a: The appropriateness of the goals and means of CSR initiative within
observer logics will be positively related to indexical authenticity judgments.
Proposition 4b: Observer perceptions of corporate identity as unique will negatively
moderate the relationship between the appropriateness of the goals and means of CSR
initiative within observer logics and indexical authenticity judgments.
Finally, the combination of iconic and indexical authenticity judgments determines
the degree of support or resistance the observer enacts toward the initiative. Figure 2
illustrates the variety of combinations that we can expect from the various combinations.
When an initiative is viewed as indexically and iconically inauthentic, (or when no indexical
judgment is made and the initiative is seen iconically inauthentic), resistance will be strong.
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When an initiative is viewed as indexically and iconically authentic, support will be strong.
We suspect that support will be less strong when no indexical judgment is made because this
absence suggests that the observer is not a highly interested stakeholder.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The mixed states indicated by the upper left and lower right quadrants of Figure 2
represent dilemmas for the observer. When an initiative is judged to be indexically authentic
but not iconically authentic, the implication is that the corporation is being true to itself, but
not to other corporations as seen from the observer’s position. This occurs when the
corporation is seen as an outlier whose identity leads it to behave in anti-corporate (but
beneficial from the observer’s point of view) ways. Unilever and its wide ranging
commitment to sustainability (Finch, 2010) provide an example of this, as do the examples of
Patagonia and Zingerman’s. Many corporations seeking to operate with social responsibility
as a priority have run into commentators whose support is qualified by their puzzlement over
the corporation’s apparently misplaced priorities. Observers guided by market logics and
‘pure’ corporate logics often have this kind of response – as if the corporation in question was
making them look bad, or failing in the important goal of maximizing profit. Observers based
in state, community, family and religious logics are more likely to provide support.
When an initiative is judged to be iconically authentic but not indexically authentic,
observers are more likely to arrive at a judgment that the corporation is engaging in
greenwashing. Doing the kinds of things other corporations do without a fundamental change
in identity does not deceive most observers.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article uses theories of authenticity, institutional pluralism and compatibility to
try to explain one of the puzzles of corporate social responsibility. We see in these theories
the basis for a systematic explanation of the fact that observers of corporate behavior
sometimes regard CSR initiatives as inauthentic window dressing. We proposed that
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perceptions of authenticity are not an all or nothing outcome. Instead, judgments can treat
initiatives as indexically authentic or iconically authentic or both or neither. Only the
combination of indexical authenticity and iconic authenticity represents uncritical acceptance.
Recognizing that authenticity judgments are composites allows us to see how nominal allies
can simultaneously be dissatisfied critics. By examining the similarity of competing logics,
the attention observers invest, the discretion observers have in choosing criteria and the
impacts of observer self-interest, we can gain a better idea of when observers will accept the
goals of CDR initiatives, and thus understand which initiatives will be perceived as which
kind of authentic by which observers and why.
Although we have not focused on the ethical concerns our theory raises we recognize
that they exist. Pluralism and applying a logic of appropriateness appear to imply a relativist
view, but we are not willing to accept that label. Our point in raising the question of
authenticity is precisely the opposite – observers have norms and values and thus ethical
positions that they use to judge the initiatives corporate actors put forward. We propose
conditions where these ethics might be stretched (self-interest, discretion), but more
importantly we recognize that corporate behavior that is consistent with the goals, means and
norms valued by observers’ logics and with the corporation’s identity is essential to crafting
CSR initiatives that stakeholders will support. Mere schematic adherence to standards of
behavior that make corporations appear legitimate in their own eyes will not satisfy outside
observers if indexical authenticity is absent. Likewise we think that consistently engaging in
CSR initiatives that serve business level strategy (Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011) may allow
corporations to co-opt some stakeholders but will not lead most observers to view the
corporation as responsible or ethical. It is laudable that Coca-Cola wants to bring clean water
to those who lack it – but this initiative can only be viewed alongside the observer’s truth that
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this behavior is ultimately in service of the strategic goal of profit. Selling billions of servings
of soda each year requires clean water for production.
How is this better than stakeholder theory? First, the ideas of pluralism and arguments
about appropriateness provide a way to understand how stakeholder groups differ and how
they are the same that goes beyond self-interest. These ideas also provide a way to
understand which organizations are under the greatest pressure to behave authentically in
their corporate social responsibility initiatives. Third these theories provide a way to assess
the mix of stakeholder groups by asking how differences between logics and variations in
discretion determine judgments about the authenticity of CSR work. If we add this to the
interest and influence framework of Freeman (1984) the potential exists for creating a much
clearer roadmap of how to manage stakeholders and their conflicts with corporate actors.
Our theory also represents an advance for institutional pluralism theory because it
connects these ideas to a broad problem. Most applications of pluralism have described the
contest between logics within organizations and while they succeed in depicting
organizational transitions and change processes, they provide only limited insight into how
institutional logics interact on a more general level.
Our theory provides a way for managers to understand which stakeholders will view
which initiatives as indexically authentic, which as iconically authentic and which as
inauthentic. Authenticity fits well with the emphasis institutional theory places on legitimacy,
normative behavior and coercion, and thus is linked to the primary motivations that compel
corporations to conform to the prescriptions of competing logics. Legitimacy seeking is a
powerful motive for corporations to try to address the issues that shape institutional fields by
gaining stakeholder support. Support will be driven by perceptions that corporate actions are
authentic, which in turn is driven in large part by whether observers accept corporate criteria
for valuing initiatives. To accomplish this, initiatives must be consistent with the
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corporation’s identity as expressed in its past and present behavior. These perceptions should
lead to variations in response that will be formed by the roles, beliefs, structures and
behaviors that characterize the observer’s institutional logic.
Our theory raises some general questions for future research. One of the most
overlooked aspects of the CSR literature is that it fails to explain why we should be more
concerned with corporate responsibility than the social responsibility of communities,
consumers, shareholders, governments, families, or religions. While it may be true that
corporate actions degrade the environment and create social and economic injustice, actors
from other sectors clearly go along. It is not trivial to recognize that actors who claim
adherence to other sectors frequently accept symbolic, strategic criteria for evaluating not
only corporate actions but their own. Perceptions of authenticity close off inquiry and thus
make it easier for actors of all kinds to juggle the competing prescriptions and proscriptions
of a pluralistic world.
Testing our theory within a positivist framework will present some interesting
challenges. While instruments exist for evaluating observer perceptions of authenticity and
perhaps observer self-interest, there do not appear to be instruments for assessing differences
between institutional logics, how observers assign roles to corporate actors, observer
discretion, observer attention, or observer self-interest. This theory might inform
experimental work; if scholars can manipulate discretion in subjects’ logics, direct tests of the
theory may be achievable. We suspect our concepts may be most useful in interpretivist
approaches to investigating stakeholder responses to specific CSR initiatives because they
provide a framework for understanding how actors resolve the competing prescriptions and
proscriptions that emerge from institutional pluralism.
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Figure 1: Theoretical model

Figure 2: Composite authenticity judgments
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Table 1 Ideal Types of Institutional Logics
Y Axis:
Categories

X Axis: Institutional Logics
Family

Community

Religion

State

Market

Profession

Corporation

Root
Metaphor

Family as firm

Common boundary

Temple as
bank

State as
redistribution
mechanism

Transaction

Profession as
relational
network

Corporation as
hierarchy

Sources of
Legitimacy

Unconditional
loyalty

Unity of will
Belief in trust &
reciprocity

Importance of faith
& sacredness in
economy & society

Democratic
participation

Share
price

Personal
expertise

Market position
of firm

Sources of
Authority

Patriarchal
domination

Commitment to
community values
& ideology

Priesthood
Charisma

Bureaucratic
participation

Shareholder
activism

Professional
association

Board of directors,
top management

Sources of
Identity

Family
reputation

Association with
deities

Social &
economic
class

Faceless

Association with
quality of craft
Personal reputation

Bureaucratic roles

Basis of
Norms

Members in
household

Emotional
connection, Egosatisfaction &
reputation
Group membership

Membership in
congregation

Citizenship in
nation

Self-interest

Membership in
guild & association

Employment in
firm

Basis of
Attention

Status in the
market

Personal investment
in group

Relation to
supernatural

Status of
interest group

Status in the
market

Status in
profession

Status in hierarchy

Basis of
Strategy

Increase
family honor

Increase status &
honor of members
& practices

Increase religious
symbolism of
natural events

Increase
community
good

Increase
efficiency,
profit

Increase in personal
reputation

Increase size &
diversification of
firm

Informal
Control
Mechanism

Family
politics

Visibility of actions

Worship of
calling

Backroom
politics

Industry
analysts

Celebrity
professionals

Organization
culture

Economics
Systems

Family
capitalism

Cooperative
capitalism

Occidental
capitalism

Welfare
capitalism

Market
capitalism

Personal
capitalism

Managerial
capitalism

Adapted from Thornton et al 2012 (p.73).
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